Survey Reviews Power Side-Channel Attacks Across Application Domains

Global: Survey Reviews Power Side-Channel Attacks Across Application Domains

A paper titled “Application-Specific Power Side-Channel Attacks and Countermeasures: A Survey” was submitted to arXiv on December 29, 2025 by Sahan Sanjaya, Aruna Jayasena and Prabhat Mishra. The authors aim to catalogue recent power‑based side‑channel attacks and the defenses proposed for them, covering a range of application areas beyond traditional cryptographic targets. Their work seeks to provide researchers and practitioners with a structured overview that highlights both attack techniques and mitigation strategies.

Expanding Scope of Power Side‑Channel Research

While earlier surveys have concentrated primarily on cryptographic implementations, the new study notes that power‑side‑channel methods are now being applied to reverse‑engineer machine‑learning models, extract user‑behavior data, and even disassemble instruction‑level code. Consequently, the attack surface has broadened, prompting a need for a more comprehensive taxonomy that reflects these diverse use cases.

Classification Framework Presented

The authors propose a classification scheme that groups attacks by application domain, the nature of the power leakage exploited, and the level of adversarial access required. They compare each technique against criteria such as data dependency, temporal resolution, and required instrumentation, allowing readers to assess the relative difficulty and impact of different approaches.

Countermeasure Strategies

In parallel with the attack taxonomy, the survey outlines countermeasures that have been developed for specific contexts. These include hardware‑level randomization, software‑level masking, and algorithmic redesigns that aim to flatten power consumption profiles. The authors evaluate each defense on factors such as performance overhead, implementation complexity, and effectiveness against the classified attacks.

Implications for Security Practice

By mapping attacks to corresponding mitigations, the paper provides a reference point for security engineers seeking to harden systems against power‑based leakage. It also highlights gaps where existing defenses are insufficient, suggesting that broader adoption of side‑channel‑aware design principles may be necessary across emerging technologies.

Future Research Directions

The survey concludes with recommendations for further investigation, including the development of standardized measurement methodologies, cross‑domain evaluation of countermeasures, and exploration of power side‑channel threats in novel hardware architectures such as neuromorphic and quantum processors. These suggestions aim to guide the next generation of research toward more resilient system designs.

This report is based on information from arXiv, licensed under Academic Preprint / Open Access. Based on the abstract of the research paper. Full text available via ArXiv.