Study Highlights Security Risks of UAV-Based Base Stations for Future 6G Networks

Global: Security Implications of UAV‑Based 6G Base Stations

A new preprint released on December 25, 2025, examines the security implications of employing unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) base stations in emerging 6G networks. Authored by Ammar El Falou, the paper identifies multiple attack surfaces associated with UAV‑BS deployments and proposes mitigation principles aimed at safeguarding emergency communications and broader network integrity.

UAV Base Stations in 6G Architecture

The integration of non‑terrestrial networks (NTNs) is considered essential for achieving seamless global coverage, particularly in underserved or disaster‑prone regions. UAVs are highlighted for their rapid deployability and flexibility, positioning them as attractive platforms for mobile, wireless base stations that can complement or replace fixed, wired infrastructure.

Identified Attack Surfaces

The analysis outlines several vulnerabilities unique to UAV‑BS systems. Limited computing and energy resources increase susceptibility to denial‑of‑service (DoS) attacks. Dependence on wireless backhaul links and GNSS navigation exposes the platforms to jamming, interception, and spoofing. The central role of UAV‑BSs in emergency alerts makes them potential targets for alert spoofing, while mobility introduces novel threats such as malicious handover manipulation.

Potential Mitigation Strategies

Mitigation principles suggested include robust authentication mechanisms, end‑to‑end encryption of backhaul traffic, and resilient GNSS alternatives or multi‑constellation support. Energy‑aware security protocols are recommended to balance protection with the limited power budget of UAVs. Intrusion detection systems tailored to aerial platforms and secure handover procedures are also emphasized.

Impact on Emergency Communications

Because UAV‑BSs can be rapidly deployed in crisis zones, ensuring the authenticity of emergency alerts is critical. The paper argues that compromised alert channels could undermine public trust and hamper response efforts, underscoring the need for tamper‑resistant signaling and verification frameworks.

Broader Implications for Non‑Terrestrial Networks

The findings extend beyond UAVs to other NTN assets such as high‑altitude platforms and satellites. The shared reliance on wireless links and navigation services suggests that the identified threats may affect a wide range of 6G deployment scenarios, prompting a holistic security approach across all aerial and space‑based components.

Future Research Directions

The author calls for further empirical testing of proposed defenses in realistic UAV‑BS testbeds, as well as standardization efforts to embed security requirements into 6G NTN specifications. Collaboration between academia, industry, and regulatory bodies is presented as a pathway to address the evolving threat landscape.

This report is based on information from arXiv, licensed under Academic Preprint / Open Access. Based on the abstract of the research paper. Full text available via ArXiv.