Study Finds Sandwich Attacks Rare and Unprofitable on Ethereum Rollups with Private Mempools

Global: Study Finds Sandwich Attacks Rare and Unprofitable on Ethereum Rollups with Private Mempools

A new research paper released on arXiv examines the feasibility, profitability, and prevalence of sandwich attacks targeting Ethereum rollups that employ private mempools. The authors develop a formal model linking attack returns to victim trade volume, liquidity depth, and slippage limits, and they assess execution constraints under private mempool conditions. Using transaction‑level data from major rollups, the study evaluates both theoretical and empirical aspects of these attacks.

Extended MEV Modeling

The authors expand an existing optimal front‑ and back‑run sizing framework to quantify how victim trade characteristics influence potential gains. Their model incorporates liquidity depth and slippage bounds, allowing a systematic comparison between attacks on Layer 1 and Layer 2 environments.

Execution Feasibility Without Builder Markets

In the absence of builder markets that guarantee atomic inclusion, the paper argues that attackers must rely on sequencer ordering, redundant transaction submissions, and priority‑fee placement. These tactics convert sandwich attacks from deterministic to probabilistic events, reducing the likelihood of successful execution.

Empirical Assessment of Sandwich Activity

Analyzing transaction data from several prominent rollups, the researchers find that simple heuristic methods dramatically overestimate sandwich activity. The majority of flagged patterns are identified as false positives, and the median net return across detected attacks is negative, indicating unprofitability.

Implications for Rollup Design

The findings suggest that, while sandwich attacks remain endemic and lucrative on Ethereum’s main chain, they are rare and often loss‑making on rollups that use private mempools. This evidence challenges prevailing assumptions about MEV in Layer 2 solutions and may guide the development of sequencing policies that further limit attack vectors.

Study Limitations and Future Directions

The analysis is based on abstract‑level information and transaction‑level data available at the time of writing. The authors note that evolving rollup architectures and mempool implementations could alter attack dynamics, and they recommend continued monitoring as these ecosystems mature.

This report is based on information from arXiv, licensed under Academic Preprint / Open Access. Based on the abstract of the research paper. Full text available via ArXiv.